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The Howard government’s decision to consult the general public about the future 
development of Australia’s defence policy is novel and welcome. Such an initiative 
seems in keeping with the best traditions of open and accountable government. Yet given 
that John Howard has already flagged that defence spending will rise whatever the 
outcome of the consultative process, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the whole 
exercise is a calculated attempt to exploit the good-will engendered by the successful 
Timor intervention,  and secure public endorsement of policies that are already pencilled 
in. 
 
Nevertheless, the publication of the government’s Green Paper, Defence Review 2000, 
does represent an opportunity to review the prevailing wisdom. Given the way that 
‘expert’ discourses tend to marginalise alternative positions within the policymaking 
process,1 this is unlikely to deflect policymakers from their seemingly pre-determined 
course, but defence is such a conspicuous consumer of limited national resources that it’s 
important to at least question some of the assumptions that inform the normally closed 
world of strategic planning. 
 
The first point to make, and the most crucial element of Australia’s strategic position, is 
that Australia is one of the most – perhaps, the most –  secure place on the planet, at least 
when judged by a conventional strategic calculus. Even the Green Paper concedes that it 
‘cannot readily foresee the circumstances under which an attack might occur or where it 
might come from’.2 It is not necessary to be a student of Clausewitz or steeped in the 
mysteries of military logic to recognise that, as an island continent, Australia presents a 
formidable, even an insurmountable challenge, to a would-be adversary. The only 
country with the capacity to invade Australia now or in the foreseeable future, as Defence 
Review 2000 makes clear, is the United States. 
 
Given that the US has been the apparently unshakeable foundation  of Australia’s 
security since the Second World War, the prospect of an American invasion can 
presumably be discounted. Clearly, the very idea is unthinkable. But is the United States 
unique in this regard? Other countries that might be thought to harbour aggressive 
intentions toward Australia – and which are presumably the justification for and target of 
our strategic readiness – seem equally unlikely threats.  
 
Indonesia, for example, plainly lacks the capacity to maintain control within its borders, 
let alone ours. China – another of the usual suspects - is not only an intimidatingly long 
way away, but even if strategists could conjure up a scenario in which it actually made 
sense to try and mount an invasion of Australia, the US would presumably not view such 
an event with complete equanimity. Indeed, it is safe to assume that the US will continue 
to make judgements about military intervention based on its own perceived strategic 
interests - with or without a formal alliance with Australia.  
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This matters because one of the justifications for maintaining a close alliance relationship 
with the US, hosting key intelligence gathering and disseminating facilities, to say 
nothing of fighting several wars, has been that this somehow guarantees American 
support if Australia is threatened. Not only is it difficult to envisage the circumstance in 
which such an insurance policy might be cashed in, but even if it were, its redemption is 
unlikely to be determined solely by Australia’s earlier investments in the relationship. In 
the meantime, though, as even conservative commentators have pointed out,3 Australia 
finds itself enmeshed in a destabilising, unproven defence system that is principally 
designed to protect America, and which may make Australia’s relations with the region 
even more problematic than they already are.4 
 
Whatever the strategic merits of the US alliance may be, it has an added symbolic 
importance in the current debate. The relationship with the US, like the whole seemingly 
pre-empted question of defence spending more generally, is  illustrative of the way some 
elements of Australia’s defence policy are simply non negotiable. Despite the invitation 
to debate, some policies are clearly sacrosanct, enjoy bilateral support, and unlikely to be 
affected by the current review. Yet while there may still be an argument for Australia 
retaining some modest military capacity to deal with illegal immigrants and fishers, 
terrorists or the like, there seems less and less justification for maintaining more 
substantial forces. There are a number of compelling forces at work in the contemporary 
international system that justify this assertion, and a number of key consequences that 
flow from them. 
 
The new international order 
 
The world no longer works in the way it once did. Some of the supposedly ‘timeless’ 
assumptions about states and their behaviour are becoming increasingly untenable.  One 
of the most important trends of recent time, especially since the end of the Cold War,  has 
been a general shift from ‘geo-politics’ to ‘geo-economics’.5 Economic development has 
become a more critical determinant of national power and welfare, and consequently a 
more important focus of policy attention. Underpinning this shift has been a more 
fundamental transformation in the underpinning logic and potential efficacy of military 
expansion and conquest. Before the Second World War, for example, it may actually 
have made some sort of sense – from the perspective of Japan’s militarily dominated 
government, at least – to invade Southeast Asia and secure access to vital resources 
threatened by the US’s containment policies. These days, however, Japan is a classic 
example of a new sort of state, one that uses corporate power and foreign investment to 
gain control over the very same resources it once attempted to secure through military 
means.6 
 
There has been a secular transformation in the underlying logic of the global political 
economy which the Green Paper acknowledges, but to which it gives scant consideration. 
Simply put, within the democratically ordered, industrialised world, economic power and 
development have become far more important to states than have conventional security 
issues.7 Indeed, the very definition of security now has a crucial economic and even 
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environmental dimension that is transforming the way security issues are conceived and 
the way inter-state relations are conducted as a consequence.8 
 
The European Union is the most advanced expression of this logic. As a consequence of 
greater political and economic interaction, it is now quite simply unthinkable that the 
countries of western Europe could go to war with each other. Long-standing foes like 
Germany and France are in fact the backbone and drivers of a continuing process of 
integration that makes issues of national defence and sovereignty increasingly 
anachronistic.  
 
The key point here is that it no longer makes sense in the way it once did to expect any 
benefits to accrue from the forcible invasion of another developed and wealthy territory. 
Not only would valuable and complex infrastructure on both sides of any conflict be 
destroyed, but even any physical assets which  survived this process are less valuable 
than they once were. In an era of the so-called knowledge economy,9 a would-be 
conqueror must firstly  stop the most skilled and wealth-generating elements of the 
population fleeing, and then bend them to his - surely women are too wise for this – will. 
 
In short, the much invoked forces of ‘globalisation’ in general and economic integration 
in particular seem to be making warfare, within the rich world, at least, increasingly 
unlikely. Oddly, policy makers have been slow to pick up on or exploit this potentially 
positive aspect to the increasingly resisted and reviled idea of globalisation. But if the 
pervasive logic of liberal capitalism is followed to its logical conclusion, there are 
powerful reasons to suppose that it might help legitimate globalisation while shoring up 
the embattled state’s fiscal position. 
 
Extending the logic of neoliberalism 
 
Within the Anglo-American economies, the last few decades have been marked by a 
sustained attempt to institutionalise market mechanisms in every sphere of economic and 
social activity. In Australia, governments of both political persuasions have placed 
neoliberal, market-centred initiatives and ideas at the centre of public policy10 – with the 
noteworthy and glaring exception of national defence. And yet if governments take the 
underlying logic and dynamic of market-centred liberalism seriously, and abide by the  
concomitant imperative to reduce government involvement in the provision of public 
services and goods wherever possible, a more radical, but philosophically consistent 
solution to Australia’s security dilemma and the increasingly unaffordable expenditure it 
entails presents itself: defence, too, could be outsourced.  
 
At a time when conventional military threats have become unimaginable, the justification 
for each nation maintaining a significant and ruinously expensive capacity to deal with a 
threat that will almost certainly never arise is increasingly difficult to justify. In this 
context the much derided – by Australia and the US, at least - New Zealand model, which 
is  based on reduced expenditure and the development of a more ‘appropriate’ military 
force, is an example Australia could well copy rather than castigate. It is not at all 
obvious that New Zealand is a less  secure place now than it was when a more integral 
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part of the ANZUS alliance and more heavily reliant on the US for its security. On the 
other hand, New Zealand’s ability to conduct an independent foreign policy, and establish 
closer and more effective international and regional relations, has been enhanced.11 
 
Yet handing responsibility for national defence to the private sector is an unrealistic and 
unsettling prospect. Whether it is any wiser to entrench a single country at the apex of an 
international security system and then hope that its interests will coincide with Australia’s 
is equally problematic. For all its well-known problems and difficulties,12 a more 
enduring solution might be to make the United Nations responsible for guaranteeing 
international and national security.  
 
Unrealisable and Utopian as such an idea might seem at present, making the UN 
responsible for international security has a number of key potential advantages. First and 
most importantly, individual states would have a greatly reduced necessity for individual 
defence spending, promoting a virtuous circle which further reduces existing ‘security 
dilemmas’. Indeed, a really creative response to making the UN a more financially secure 
and independent body capable of such a role, might be to raise some of the funds through 
a tax on international capital movements,13 thus helping to stabilise the fragile internal 
financial system as well. 
 
If the UN did have an independent military capacity with which to pursue peace-keeping, 
and if necessary peace-making activities, it would also have the great benefit of de-
politicising the sorts of operations Australia recently undertook in Timor. In the longer 
term a UN military capacity in which members had confidence might even help to wind 
back the seemingly inexorable spread of nuclear weapons. Surely, these are desirable 




Are such ideas, however,  simply the unrealistic pipe-dreams of the strategically 
illiterate? Perhaps. But who would have thought that the nations of Western Europe 
would seriously contemplate developing a collective army?14 Who would have believed 
that so many countries would come to have completely undefended and ‘open’ borders? 
Indeed, who would have imagined that the bi-polar order that characterised the Cold War 
for more than 50 years would be swept away in a moment? Certainly not the generations 
of strategic ‘experts’ who advised governments where to spend public money. 
 
If the Howard government’s ‘debate’ is to amount more than an arcane discussion about 
the relative technical merits of expensive military hardware, then alternative ideas need to 
be, if not taken seriously, then at least more convincingly repudiated. The onus should be 
on those who wish to spend money on warfare rather than welfare to defend such 
priorities and to precisely identify the threats that justify them. Given Australia’s woeful 
performance in what seem to be increasingly important knowledge-related activities,15 we 
need to collectively ask whether we can afford to spend some $13 billion a year on a 
potential threat that even the government’s own experts concede they cannot identify.  
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Australia’s unique natural advantages and the increasingly remote prospect of a direct 
military threat to this country,  mean that Australia could exploit its benign strategic 
environment. Not only might significantly decreased military expenditure produce 
immediate returns in terms of the budget bottom line and potentially better regional 
relations, but it might also serve as a powerful exemplar of the benefits that accrue from a 
less militaristic ‘posture’. After all, if Australia cannot take advantage of the new 
international order and break free of the old paradigm, who can? 
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